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On 31 January, Sergio Mattarella, a former Constitutional Court judge, was elected as the new
President of Italy. James L. Newell and Arianna Giovannini write that while the formal powers
assigned to the President remain fairly limited, the appointment of Mattarella represented an
important victory for Italy’s Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi. They argue that the nature of the
negotiations leading up to the new President’s election highlight the authority Renzi now holds over
his own party, but may have implications for Renzi’s working relationship with former Italian Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi.
On 14 January, the 89 year-old Italian President Giorgio Napolitano resigned his position, making
way for the election of a new President – the ex-Christian Democrat, and former Constitutional
Court judge, Sergio Mattarella. The resignation, and the new President’s election (on 31 January),
came at a very delicate moment in Italian politics, coinciding as they do with concerted attempts by
the centre-left Prime Minister, the 40-year old ex-mayor of Florence, Matteo Renzi, to push through
much-needed electoral-law and constitutional reforms.
Background: Napolitano and the 2013 parliamentary election
Napolitano had come by his position in April 2013, following a watershed election the previous February – an
election that had brought the country to the brink of ungovernability. Then, widespread disenchantment with the
conduct of established politicians and the performance of the political class had led to the explosive growth of a
popular protest movement, the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star Movement, M5S) led by the comedian, Beppe
Grillo. Winning 25 per cent of the vote, it had made signiﬁcant inroads into the support of both centre left and centre
right, leading to the impression of a country divided into three more-or-less equal segments, none of which could
agree with either of the others; and importantly, thanks to the electoral system, it led to the lack of any overall
majority in the upper house, the Senate.
This was signiﬁcant because the Senate, which is elected at the same time as the lower house (the Chamber of
Deputies), has exactly the same legislative powers as the former, and therefore has the power to install and unseat
governments through votes of (no) conﬁdence. Napolitano had been elected as President in 2006 and his mandate
was due to expire shortly after the 2013 election. Then, Parliament – and the regional representatives which,
together with the legislature, comprise the electoral college responsible for choosing presidents – found it
impossible to agree on a successor.
Divided internally, the parliamentary parties had in desperation asked the only candidate with a chance of winning a
compact vote on right and left – Napolitano – to stand for an unprecedented second term. Napolitano had made a
condition of agreeing to the request for the formation of an equally unprecedented grand coalition government,
whose principal components would be the centre-left Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, PD) and its ‘arch
enemy’ on the centre right led by Silvio Berlusconi.
Renzi’s reform eﬀorts
In January of last year, Renzi had reached agreement with Berlusconi for electoral law reform and a reform of the
Senate – reforms which on paper looked like having a good chance of being passed because, together, Renzi’s
party and that of Berlusconi commanded a clear majority and the two seemed to have a strong incentive to achieve
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success given the threat posed by the M5S.
By sponsoring an electoral-law reform that provided
for a majority seat bonus for the ‘party or coalition’
obtaining 37 per cent of the vote (and after later
discussion, the ‘party list’ achieving 40 per cent),
together with a run-oﬀ between the two best placed if
none reached that percentage, Renzi and Berlusconi
calculated that they would make life diﬃcult for Beppe
Grillo’s Movement – which, by its nature, would ﬁnd it
harder to coalesce with other forces and so obtain
the magic percentage or emerge as one of the top
two.
But because it applied to the Chamber of Deputies
only, the proposal was necessarily linked to a change
in the constitutional position of the Senate that would
limit its size, its legislative powers and its powers to
install and unseat governments. Together, the
reforms were widely viewed as being essential to
improvements in the performance of Italy’s
institutions and thus to stemming the tide of popular dissatisfaction expressed by the M5S.
Renzi and Berlusconi in the 2015 presidential election
It is for this reason, then, that the presidential election came at a critical juncture. First, passage of the twin reforms
is by no means assured. For one thing, both centre left and centre right are internally divided on them; for another
the reform paradox must be reckoned with – can one expect senators, ultimately, to support a reform that will result
in them voting themselves out of oﬃce? Moreover, the Senate reform must be passed using the cumbersome
procedure for constitutional amendment. This requires two separate votes in each of the houses taking place within
three months of each other, and it can be made the subject of a popular referendum if it is passed with less than a
two-thirds majority on the second vote in either of the houses.
Second – and here we come to the crux of the matter – the positions parties take in presidential elections inevitably
impinge on the positions they take in negotiating with other parties on ‘ordinary’, substantive matters. This is
especially true in the early twenty-ﬁrst century where the President’s actual, as opposed to formal, powers have
become much more signiﬁcant than they were in the past, thanks to the ‘mediatisation’ of politics and the relative
weakness of the Italian parties.
In this case, Renzi was aware that the solidity of his ‘reform pact’ (the so-called Patto del Nazareno) depended on
ﬁnding a presidential candidate amenable to Berlusconi. He also had to keep in mind that while only a simple
majority is required to elect the President in the fourth round of voting, two-thirds majorities were required in the ﬁrst
three rounds of voting, and Renzi did not have the required numbers to reach that level of support.
The fact that Renzi’s party was internally divided over the reform proposals and the collaboration with Berlusconi
that they entailed, ensured that support from his own party was also far from assured. His tactic in the immediate
aftermath of Napolitano’s resignation was to refuse to be drawn on his choice of candidate and then to urge his
followers (as Berlusconi did in the case of his followers) to cast a blank ballot in the initial three rounds of voting –
while at the same time consulting Berlusconi in conﬁdence. Neither man could aﬀord to be seen as being the
hostage of the other so they kept their cards close to their chests.
Thus it was that on 28 January, the day before the voting was due to begin, Berlusconi announced to his followers:
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“we have not yet found a candidate. We will be in permanent consultations to ﬁnd a presidential nominee able to
guarantee our interests”. Meanwhile, Renzi announced, obliquely, to his followers: “The proﬁle of the ideal candidate
outlined during the course of the consultations was of one who would defend the Constitution, a politician acceptable
to almost everyone – [but] we will not accept vetoes”.
In eﬀect, the decision to advocate blank ballots in the ﬁrst three rounds was a joint one on the part of Berlusconi and
Renzi, who were aware of the diﬃculties in ﬁnding a mutually agreeable candidate able to succeed at that point, and
aimed to postpone the real negotiations, which began in earnest on 29 January when Renzi publicly endorsed the
candidature of Mattarella.
He had pulled a rabbit out of his hat: as a member of the PD who had once resigned as a minister in protest at
legislation that would assist Berlusconi to build his media empire, Mattarella was opposed by Berlusconi. But the
entrepreneur was aware that, as a widely respected politician who had been prominent in the ﬁght against the
Maﬁa, Mattarella would not only attract relatively cohesive support on the centre left but would attract the support of
many on the centre right too.
He was thus left with a choice: either support Mattarella and appear to have caved in to Renzi, or urge his
supporters to continue to cast blank ballots in the fourth round of voting, knowing that in the secrecy of the polling
booth some might disobey him – with a corresponding dent to his authority. In the end, he chose the latter option
and the blow to his authority was duly delivered: Mattarella was elected with 665 votes, almost a two thirds majority,
in the process revealing a major split in Berlusconi’s party, since the number of blank ballots was about 40 less than
the number of his followers.
Renzi’s victory
The outcome of the presidential election represents an important victory for Renzi because it reinforces his
leadership of the PD, highlighting that he has substantially more authority over his party than many thought he would
be capable of when he became leader at the end of 2013. It is also important for Renzi in terms of his relationship
with Berlusconi.
The former Prime Minister, as is well known, has for years been widely criticised over conﬂicts of interest underlying
his position as a prominent politician and as a signiﬁcant entrepreneur. So Renzi was always vulnerable to criticisms
within and outside his party (especially from the M5S) that the Patto del Nazareno  was a kind of unholy alliance
based on an exchange of favours, not all of which were likely to be legitimate. What the presidential election
outcome does, then, is suggest that the Prime Minister is far less beholden to Berlusconi and his interests than
Renzi’s critics have so far argued. And this too strengthens him.
While Renzi’s victory could put the deal on institutional reforms with Berlusconi in jeopardy, his conﬁdence seems to
suggest that he has played his cards right, if not with Berlusconi himself, perhaps with other members of the centre
right. On the one hand, some among Berlusconi’s followers, feeling that they have been outmanoeuvred by Renzi,
have spoken of the death of the Patto del Nazareno . Others have urged caution, aware of the dangers of appearing
to subvert an agreement widely portrayed in the media as one that represents the best opportunity in at least a
decade for a much needed overhaul of the political system.
On balance the judgement of Federico Santi seems correct, namely, that the manner of Mattarella’s election “will
undoubtedly increase friction within and without the ruling coalition. It may complicate reform progress at the margin.
However, it will not derail reforms or threaten political stability”.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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